Excerpts
from
"The Common Sense
by
Penguin Books, 1951,
pages 125 - 141.
Chapter Eight
"Truth and Value"
People
who are troubled
But
We are troubled
We are faced
We
do not consciously
But that
Beyond
And
The Empirical habit
And it
has been busy now
For of course,
The ideals
It is plain enough
The medieval doctrine
And we see
So we are
Nor
I have said
I have
This is very striking
There
Jews
Savonarola
Sidney's
Yet Sidney
The harsh pattern
In our own day,
Yet
Often
A book
Raphael
In Literature,
2
It is
this
last charge
which is
commonly
brought
against
Science.
The claim
The implication
This charge
No one
On the contrary,
It is
And
We mean
No Ethic
There is
It is
For
If there
We cannot
We must
And
But
Whatever else
They
are ashamed
to lie
in fact
and
in intention.
And
T. H. Huxley
Yet
All of them
3
In
the last thirty years,
a school of Philosophy
has grown up
which takes
the narrow view,
that
to be True
means
to be
verifiable
in Fact.
It
This test
It rejects altogether
'Virtue
is
its own reward'
is
in this Philosophy
a piece
of Meaningless
good cheer;
sensible Philosophers
only
discuss
such statements
as
'Water
is
made up
of
Hydrogen
and
Oxygen'.
Here we have
a Philosophy
in which
Science
seems to have
gone over
to
the counter attack,
by
replying
to
the charge
that
it contains
no Values
with
the curt remark
that Values
are
a lot of nonsense
anyway.
But
as
so often happens
when
Philosophers
take up arms
for Science,
the Science
that
is being defended
is
long out of date.
The ideal
of
the Meaningful
and
the True
which
this Positivist Philosophy
sets up
is indeed
the nineteenth-century
conception
of Science.
These are
the notions
of Meaning
and
of Truth
which
Joule
had in mind
a hundred years ago
when
he showed
that
Heat
is precisely
a form
of Mechanical Energy,
or later
Hertz
when
he found
the Radio Waves
whose existence
had
been implied
by
Clerk Maxwell's
equations
of
the Electromagnetic Field.
But
such notions
of Truth
have already
turned out
to be
insufficient
for
Science itself,
in
the modern sense.
So that
it is certainly
an odd service
to sweep
Value and Ethics
out
of the door
with
this broom,
which
at once
also
gets rid
of Science
and
of
Human Knowledge.
There are
a number of grounds
why
Logical Positivism
will
not do;
and they have
this
in common,
that
it is
a piecemeal Philosophy.
It models itself
on
the heroic attempt
by
Russell
and
Whitehead
to derive
all Mathematics,
including
such
difficult ideas
as
the Continuous
and
the Infinite,
from
a finite number
of axioms.
Mathematics
was
to be built up
step by step
from
a set
of particulate
or atomic
propositions.
This was
a great
and
an important work
in Logic.
It did not
wholly succeed,
even
in its own field.
But it remains
a monument
there
to
the two masters
who created it.
The
Positivist Philosophers
have taken
this attempt
for their model,
in picturing
Knowledge
in
the same way
as
built up
from pieces
of particulate Fact.
But if
Mathematics
has difficulty
in fitting
this structure,
it is plain
that
Empirical Knowledge
does
not
begin
to fit it.
Obviously
we do not get
our Knowledge
in this way,
from
particulate pieces
of Information
like
'this is Red'.
The Mind
does not begin
from such
Sense Experiences,
but always
from
integrated bundles
of them,
that is,
from
Things.
How else
do I recognize
what I am
now looking at
as
a Book,
and
identify it
as
the same book
I was looking at
before
I turned
the page?
We do not
make up
our Knowledge
like
a Meccano Set
piecemeal
from
minute
nuts and bolts
of Experience.
This
in itself
so far
is only
an issue
of Psychology.
But
there is
a deeper issue,
which
is this,
that
neither
can we
break
our experience
down
into these
nuts and bolts.
Not even
as
a hypothesis
will it do
to think
of Knowledge
as
reducible
to
atomic propositions.
I have
already spoken
of
the logical reasons
why
this
cannot be so.
If it were,
there would
remain,
in
this atomic world
of Knowledge,
statements
which
could be
neither
True nor False.
So
the Logical Positivist,
having been
at pains
to call everything
not in
his Meccano world
nonsense,
would discover
that
even this world
is still
chock-full
of nonsense.
But
I do not want
to stop
at this
logical failing,
as if
we were
scoring
debating points.
What is
the deeper reason
why
the atomic construction
of Knowledge
fails?
Why ought we
to have
foreseen
that
it must break down
in contradiction?
The answer is
that this
atomic construction
supposes,
like
the Atomic Science
of
the last century,
that
there lies
below our experience
a set of Facts
which are
more exact
than experience;
which are
indeed Exact.
'This is Red,'
we are told,
and
it is assumed
that
we have now
dug down
to
a base of Knowledge
where
there is
no more room
for disagreement:
either
This is Red,
or
it is not Red.
But what
is 'This'
that
we are both
supposed,
the speaker
and I,
to see
as
the same spot?
And what is
the Red
about which
as
sensible beings
we cannot differ?
Red light
has a wavelength
of about
one
three-hundred-thousandth
of an inch:
to what
order
of accuracy
are we
to read it
in order
to agree
on
our atomic proposition?
In the world
of Science,
neither
'This'
nor
'Red'
are entities
which
can be defined
with
complete precision.
'This'
will always
escape
in
the Brownian
to-and-fro
of atoms,
and
'Red'
must be
embedded
in
a range
of uncertainty
of
a few wavelengths.
The world
cannot
be described,
as Positivists
have
explicitly supposed,
by giving
exact
physical co-ordinates
to
every point
in a statement,
and
then
verifying
whether or not
the statement
is True.
Every co-ordinate
reference
must
carry with it
an
area of Uncertainty.
And this
implies
that
the verification
is itself
Uncertain,
and
must be
allowed
a margin of error.
To think otherwise
is
to wish oneself back
to
the atomic paradise
of
a hundred and fifty years ago,
and
to
the blissful simplicity
of which
Blake said
with
imaginative contempt
that
it hoped
'to build
a Universe
with
Farthing Balls'.
It is
indeed clear
that
there is
an essential fault
within
the basic conception
of the Positivist,
that
we can
judge Truth
by
a simple act
of verification.
What
are we
to verify?
An
atomic proposition,
that is
a statement
in the simplest form
about
the simplest
kind of Fact.
But
the Facts
do not keep still
for us,
either
in
Space
or
in Time.
I cannot
verify now
a statement
about
a Fact
which
has
already passed.
I must
make
my statement
about
a future Fact,
and
this means
that
I must
turn it
into
a prediction.
Indeed,
the idea
of verification
must imply
prediction,
and
prediction
as we have seen
cannot
be separated
from
its own area
of Uncertainty.
What
I have written
is not meant
to belittle
nineteenth-century
Science.
By no means;
it was
a wonderful achievement,
and
the bulk of it remains so
to this day.
But
there runs under it
a conception of the world
which
has turned out to be
too simple.
The conception
was of a world
which could be described
exactly,
if not by today's scientists
then by tomorrow's.
I learned to think
about that world
from the lively account
of
a master
of simple exposition,
the Geometer
and
Philosopher
William Clifford.
His account
was called
characteristically
"The Common Sense
of the Exact Sciences".
The difference
between
his title and mine
is not accidental.
I have deliberately
chosen the title
"The Common Sense
of Science"
because
it underlines
the difference
between
our two centuries.
We see today
that
in the strict sense
there are
no exact Sciences.
There is Science,
and there is
Common Sense;
and
both must learn
to assimilate
into their
methods and basic ideas
the
underlying
Uncertainties
of
all Knowledge.
The best Scientists
of the last century
did foresee this.
I have spoken
of Clifford,
and
it is fair
to the memory
of that great man
to recall
that
he had
some
of this foresight.
Indeed,
Clifford
has
a genius
for
such
Prophetic insight.
"The Common Sense
of
he Exact Sciences"
contains
the first hint
of the idea
that
massive bodies
give
a local curvature
to space,
which
Einstein
has since
worked out fully.
Clifford
was
after all
a contemporary
of Galton,
and
when he died
at thirty-five
his book
was edited by
the founder
of
modern Statistics,
Karl Pearson.
And here
is what Clifford said
about
Scientific Truth,
looking out
of
the nineteenth century
forward
into ours.
Remember, then,
that Scientific thought
is the guide of action;
that the Truth at which it arrives
is not that
which we can ideally contemplate
without error,
but that which
we may act upon without fear;
and you cannot fail to see
that Scientific thought
is not
an accomplishment
or condition
of Human Progress,
but
Human Progress itself.
This is
an arresting thought
on
a number of counts.
It puts pithily
the view
of
Science as action
which
I have underlined.
And the action
looks forward;
it is distinguished
from Contemplation
by
looking
towards the Future.
And
arresting too
here
is
the criterion
of
what is True.
The realistic basis
of Science
as
I have stressed it
cannot be put better
than in
Clifford's definition,
that
its Truth
'is not that
which we can
ideally contemplate
without error,
but
that which
we may
act upon
without fear.'
What Science
observes,
what Science
predicts
has
all the shortcomings
of Fact.
The Facts
supply
the signal
for
the Future,
but
the signal
is
necessarily Uncertain
and
its interpretation
against
the background
of
the irrelevant
will be
inaccurate.
The prediction
which
we base
on
the signal
must be
a Statistical one.
It
does not
read
the Future,
it
forecasts it;
and
the forecast
has
Meaning
only
because
we couple it
with
its own estimate
of
Uncertainty.
The Future
is
as it were
always
a little
out of focus,
and
everything
that
we foresee
in it
is seen
embedded
in
a small area
of Uncertainty.
It is
the
Human Situation
and
the situation
of Science.
We do not
Contemplate
the Facts
without error,
but
because
we know
what we are doing,
we
may
act
upon them
without fear.
'Because
we know
what
we are doing':
this
is
the crux
of Science.
We
are not
merely
observing
and
predicting
Facts;
and
that is why
any
Philosophy
which builds up
Science
only
from Facts
is mistaken.
We know,
that is
we find
Laws;
and
every
Human Action
uses
these Laws,
and
at the same time
tests them
and
feels towards
new Laws.
It is not
the Form
of
these Laws
which matters.
The Laws
of Science,
like those
which we use
in
our private behavior,
remain
helpful and Truthful
whether
they contain
words like
'always',
or
only
'more often than not'.
What matters
is
the recognition
of the Law
in
the Facts.
It is
the Law
which
we verify:
the Pattern,
the Order,
the Structure
of events.
This is why
Science
is so full
of
the symbolism
of
Numbers and Geometry,
which are
the most
familiar expressions
of
Structural relations.
It is
in no sense,
as
Humanists
sometimes pretend,
a neutral record
of
what happens
in
an endless
Mechanical Encyclopedia.
This
mistaken view
goes back
to
the eighteenth century.
It pictures Scientists
as
Utilitarians
still crying
Let be!
and
still believing
that
the world runs best
with
no other
regulating principles
than
Natural Gravitation
and
Human self-interest.
But
this
picture
of the world
of
Mandeville
and
Bentham
and
Dickens's "Hard Times"
was
never Science.
For Science
And
the
Truth of Science
is not
Truth to Fact,
which
can never be
more
than approximate,
but
the Truth
of
the Laws
which
we see
within
the Facts.
And
this kind
of
Truth
is
as difficult
and
as Human
as
the sense
of Truth
in a painting
which is
not
a photograph,
or
the feeling
of Emotional Truth
in
a movement
in Music.
When we
speak
of Truth,
we make
a Judgment
between
What Matters
and
What Does Not,
and
we feel
the unity
of
its different parts.
We do this
as much
in
Science
as in
the Arts
or
in Daily Life.
We make
a Judgment
when
we prefer
one Theory
to another
even
in Science,
since
there is
always
an endless number
of theories
which
can account for
all
the known Facts.
And
the principles
of
this Judgment
have
some
deep appeal
which
is more
than
merely Factual.
William of Ockham
first suggested
to Scientists
that
they should
prefer
that Theory
which uses
in its explanation
the smallest number
of
Unknown Agents.
Science
has
held
to this principle
now
for
six hundred years.
But
is there
indeed
any ground
for it
other than
a kind of
Aesthetic Satisfaction,
much
like that
of
sacrificing
your Queen
at Chess
in order
to mate
with
a Knight?
We cannot
define
Truth in Science
until
we move
from
Fact
to
Law.
And
within
the body of Laws
in turn,
what
impresses us
as Truth
is
the
Orderly Coherence
of
the pieces.
They
fit together
like
the Characters
in
a great Novel,
or like
the words
in
a Poem.
Indeed,
we
should keep
that
last analogy
by us
always.
For Science
is
a Language,
and
like a Language,
it defines
its parts
by
the way
they make up
a Meaning.
Every Word
in the Sentence
has
some
Uncertainty of Definition,
and yet
the Sentence
defines its own
Meaning
and
that
of its Words
conclusively.
It is
the internal
Unity
and
Coherence
of Science
which
give it Truth,
and
which make it
a better
System
of Prediction
than
any
less Orderly Language.
It is common
to all
Systems of Value,
and
is fundamental
to
most of them.
And
it is
a Value.
We cannot
take it for granted
as
something
self-evident
in Science
any more than
in Art
or Morals
or Religion.
In all of them
Truth
rests on
an act
of
Free Human Judgment.
In
none of them
of course
can
this Judgment
be exercised
without
experience:
there is
no Truth,
not even
Religious Truth,
which
calls for
no Sanction
from Fact.
There are
other
Values:
Goodness,
Beauty,
Right Conduct.
They have
their echoes
even
in Science;
and
there is
one Value,
Freedom of Human Ideas,
which is
the Essential Condition
for
the health
of Science.
But
it is
not my point
to show
laboriously
that
Science
as much as
the Arts
creates and implies
all
the Human Values.
I have wanted
This example,
the Truth,
is
a critical one;
and
it will serve to show
that
Science
cannot exist
as
a blank
and
Mechanical Activity.
There is
still more
in Science
than this.
It shares
the Values
of
all Human Action,
and
it also
adds
to these Values.
The Human Values
penetrate through
all
our Actions,
and
they are
strikingly alike
in Civilizations
which
are
thousands of years
apart.
The Aztecs
and
the Minoans,
the Chaldees,
the Cherokees,
and
the Shakers
held in common
ideas
about
Human
Dignity and Value
which go
far deeper
than
the surface differences
of
time and place.
The likenesses
are
as heartening
in
their Arts
and
their speculations.
Yet,
though
the Values
are alike,
they
are
not identical.
The
Human Values
change,
slowly
but
not negligibly.
And
in
this change,
Science
plays
a creative part.
For
the Values
rest
at bottom
on
Acts of Judgment.
And every
Act of Judgment
is
a division
of the field
of our experience
into
What Matters
and
What Does Not.
I spoke of this
at
the beginning
of this book:
that
at
the basis
of
Human Thought
lies
the Judgment
of
what is like
and
what is unlike.
In picking out
what
we shall call
alike,
we make
the basic Judgment,
that
here is something
which is
Important to us.
We do this
when
we say
that
men
are
like women,
or
that
the earth
is like
the planets,
or
that
the air
is
like wine.
Aldous Huxley
in
his novel
"Barren Leaves"
speculates
at length
about
the word 'love'
in different
European languages;
but I,
coming
to England
as a boy,
was
struck more
by
the existence
in English alone
of
the verb
'to like'.
The Human Values
are bound up
with
what
we Judge
to be
like and unlike;
and
when Science
shifts
that Judgment,
it makes
as
profound
a shift
in
these Values.
The Greeks
built
a wonderful
Civilization,
yet
it did not
outrage
their
sense of values
to
hold men
in Slavery.
They
did not feel
the Slave
and
Citizen
to be alike
Men.
By
the end
of
the eighteenth century,
it was felt
in
the Western world
that
all white men
are alike;
but
William Wilberforce
spent
a lifetime
in persuading
his generation
that
black slaves
and white
are alike
in Human Dignity.
Science
helped
to create
that sensibility,
by
widening the view
of
what is like
and
what unlike.
It helped
to widen it enough
to make
cruelty to animals
a
particularly
detested offense
in England.
In
our own generation,
we
have seen
the Human Values
perverted
in Nazi Germany
into
a monstrous scale
of self-approval.
And
the perversion
was bolstered
by
a deliberate attempt
to go back on
what
Science
and
Humanity
has struggled
slowly
to grasp,
the likeness
of Man.
The hateful Values
of
the Nazi
rest at bottom
on
this
False Judgment,
which
Science
for
three hundred years
has tried
to root out:
that
what I do
is
not like
what
others do.
7
This
is
the constant urge
of Science
as well as
of the Arts,
to broaden
the
likeness
for which
we grope
under
the Facts.
the
wider likeness,
whether
between
Space and Time,
or
between
the Bacillus,
the Virus,
and the Crystal,
we
enlarge
the Order
in the Universe;
but
more than this,
we enlarge
its Unity.
And it is
the
Unity of Nature,
Living and Dead,
for which
our thought
reaches.
This is
a far deeper
conception
than
any assumption
that
Nature
must
be uniform.
We seek
to
find Nature
one,
a
coherent Unity.
This gives
to Scientists
their
sense of mission
and,
let us
acknowledge it,
of
Aesthetic fulfillment:
that
every research
carries
the sense
of
drawing together
the threads
of
the World
into
a
patterned web.
Each
Law of Science
so
holds together
a scattered array
of Facts.
But
the Laws
themselves
are not
the final
Unifying agents.
Each Law
is still
only a Rule
for
making Predictions,
as
Aristotle predicted
that
apples
will
go on
falling
to the ground.
The great
Unifying thoughts
are
knots
where the Laws
cross one another
and
are
held together:
the thought
that
all Matter is alike,
or
that earthly Space
runs beyond
the stars,
or
that
there is
a physical continuity
from
one generation
to the next.
We come
to take
these
crossing places
for granted,
and
forget
how long it took
to
make
these concepts.
Yet
it is they
that give
the Unity:
the concept
of Matter,
of Space,
of Evolution
and
Inheritance.
They are
the links
and
the critical
joints
in the whole
Structure
of
our Understanding.
And
they are
not
self-evident:
Mass,
Energy,
Mind,
the nervous system,
the ecology
of
host and enzyme:
these
were
not obvious
to Aquinas
and
ready
to
be shuffled
into Laws
by
the first
gifted Mathematician.
On the contrary,
just as
the Laws
unite
the Facts,
so
the concepts
of Science
unite
its Laws
into
an
Orderly world
which
hangs on
those
bold knots
in the network.
When
we follow
the growth
of
a Science,
we come
to understand
how
that movement
has been
probing for
these
Unifying concepts.
Look at
the movement
of Biology
since
the day
of
Ray and Linnaeus:
the listing
of
like Species,
the
discovery of cells,
of
their division
and of
their sexual fusion;
the elaboration
of
the mechanisms
of Inheritance
and
of Natural Selection;
and
from all these,
the
long distillation
of
the rich
and
many-sided concept
of Evolution.
Look
at Chemistry,
from
Dalton's Law
of
the combination
of
Constant Weights
through
the
Periodic Table
of the Elements
and
the work
of
Davy and Faraday
on
their
Electric behavior,
to
the complex Concepts
of
Molecular Structure
today
and of
the more
and
the less
saturated
shells
of Electrons
in
the Chemical atom.
Or look at
the march
of
Physics to Unity:
the slow
crystallization
in the
Scientific Revolution
of the
Universal Concepts
of
Matter,
Mass,
and Weight;
the concept
of
the Conservation
of Mass,
the Concept of
Energy
in
its many forms,
in
Rumford
and
Joule
and
Clerk Maxwell,
and
of its
Conservation;
the
leap
by Planck
in 1900
to
the particulate
Nature
of Energy;
and
then
the most brilliant piece
of
Unifying insight,
Einstein's identification
of
Mass and Energy
in
a single Concept.
We have
seen this
lead to
the creation
of
Energy from Matter;
to
a picture
of
Space
as closed
but
possibly expanding;
and now,
in the last years,
to
the speculation
that
in the process
of expansion,
gravitational Energy
is
indirectly lost,
and
may
reappear
as
new-born Matter.
Science
is
a process
of
creating
new Concepts
which
Unify
our understanding
of the world,
and
the process
is today
bolder
and
more
far-reaching,
more
triumphant even
than
at
the great threshold
of
the Scientific Revolution.
8
The Concepts
of
Value
are
not different
in kind
from these.
It is
not easy
to
formulate
Laws
of Art;
at least,
as
the Augustans
showed
so woefully,
the Laws
which
are
easy to formulate
are
bad Laws.
Yet
there is
a likeness
which
runs under
all
works of Art,
and
the single works
are
held together
by
common standards.
And
the standards
in turn
are
Unified
in
such
larger Concepts,
such knots
which
hold
the different
Historical tastes
together,
as
the Concepts
of Beauty
and Truth
and Coherence.
So
the Rules of conduct
run together
at last
in
the Concepts
of Truth
and Goodness
and Justice
and Right
and Duty.
These
Concepts of Value
are
not the same
as
the
Concepts of Science.
But
like them
they express
the
deep relation
between
the Human Mind
and
the world
which
it matches.
If this
were
a book
about
Aesthetics,
I should have
studied
the way in which
Concepts
like Taste
and Fitness
and Beauty
have grown
and
how they
cohere together.
And
if this
were
a book
about Ethics,
I should have
studied
another range
of
Concepts of Value.
In a book
about Science,
I have looked at
the growth
of
its Concepts:
the Machine
and
the Model,
Order,
Cause
and
Chance,
Prediction
and
the Future,
the fundamental
Concept of Law
and
the particular Concepts
which range
from
Waves
to
Matter
and
the Cell.
All these
are expressions
of
the relation of Man
and
his societies
to
the Universal Nature.
None
is achieved
without
Man's Judgment
of
that Order,
what is
like
and
what is
unlike,
what in it
Matters
and
What Does Not.
Let us
not forget
this
Judgment
even
in
the humblest Law
about
Ohms
and
Volts
and
Amperes,
for it rests
at bottom
on
a choice
of something
that
Man
feels
to bind him
to
his Environment.
The Judgment
is already
in
the work.
The
work of Art
contains
the
Artist's Judgment;
so that
it has been
wisely said
of it,
that
it is not we
by our standards
who Judge
the
work of Art,
but
the work
which
Judges us.
And
in the
same sense,
it is not we
who stand
perplexed
round
the discoveries
of Science
who
Judge it,
but
Science
which
Judges us.
Einstein
rounded out
three centuries
of
questioning
of Nature
when
he
equated
Energy and Mass
in
a single line,
E = MC2.
This is
not the same
Unification
of Concepts
as
that
for which
Keats
was searching
when
he closed
the
"Ode on a Grecian Urn"
with
the lines,
is
more important
than
the difference.
is
more helpful
in
making us
understand
that the
Concepts of Science
are
like the
Concepts of Value,
monuments
to
our sense
of
Unity in Nature.
+++
from
"The Common Sense
of
Science",
by
Dr. Jacob Bronowski,
Penguin Books, 1951,
pages 125 - 141.
Chapter Eight
"Truth and Value"
People
who are troubled
in mind
by the changes
which they see
Science
working in their world
usually
single out
single out
the technical changes:
the Airplane,
the Bomb,
the Bomb,
the habit
of reading Newspapers,
of reading Newspapers,
the shift
from
homely comforts
homely comforts
and
home music
home music
to Television.
But
under
these changes
these changes
there runs
in us all
in us all
a deeper division
between
the social habits
of our schooldays
and
new habits of thought.
We are troubled
by
a two-sidedness
in
our own behavior,
our own behavior,
where one side
is what we have
long been taught
to value,
to value,
and
the other
is
worldly success.
worldly success.
We are faced
every day
with actions
of which
our own
code of conduct
code of conduct
makes us ashamed,
but
which
which
we find compelling
if we are
to battle
with the hard Facts
of society.
We
do not consciously
blame Science
for this rift
until
it throws out
it throws out
some
unavoidable challenge,
unavoidable challenge,
such as
in our time
has been set
by
the Atomic Bomb.
the Atomic Bomb.
But that
sharp issue
is merely
a symbol.
Beyond
all our actions
stands
the larger shadow:
how are we
to choose
between
what
we have been
we have been
taught
to think right
to think right
and
something else
which
manifestly succeeds?
And
this empirical test
of success
grows more pressing
as we
grow used to it
in Science.
The Empirical habit
never lets
the traditional beliefs
alone
for long,
even
within Science.
And it
has been busy now
for quite
six hundred years
six hundred years
in changing
the accepted codes
of good
and right
conduct.
For of course,
these codes
have not
remained fixed
since the days
of
William of Ockham.
The ideals
of what is good
have suffered
slow
but
remarkable changes,
even
in the same Church.
It is plain enough
that the ideals
of the Renaissance
are
not the same
as those
of the Fathers,
and
more recently,
that
the Protestant virtues
differ
from the Catholic,
which have
themselves
changed.
The medieval doctrine
of
the Just Price
had been
deeply made over
before
a Pope
could write
Rerum Novarum
in 1891.
And we see
what has become
of
the Christian virtues
in
the Methodism
of
the early
nineteenth century:
nineteenth century:
how the stress
has shifted
from charity
and
loving kindness,
loving kindness,
quite unconsciously,
to
the socially powerful
virtues
of Thrift,
Sobriety,
Frugality,
and
Independence.
Independence.
So we are
in a state
of change
today
not because
we have let go
of
some ancient
absolute of perfection,
but
because
like every age
our age
is trying
to re-discover
its own Conscience.
Nor
is Science
the only ferment
at work.
I have said
again and again
in this book
that
Science is
a part,
a characteristic part,
of
Human Activity
at large.
I have
been at pains
in
the last chapter
to show
Scientific Method
as
the method
of
all Human Inquiry,
all Human Inquiry,
which
differs at last
only in
this,
this,
that
it is explicit
and
systematic.
This is very striking
when we come
to problems
of
right judgment
and
good conduct.
There
never
has been
a great book
or
a powerful
work of art
which
has not been
thought immoral
by
those
with
an older tradition.
Jews
still think
the New Testament
immoral,
and Christians
the Koran.
Savonarola
thought
Florentine art
licentious,
and
when
George Eliot
wrote about him
in the last century,
she thought
him
licentious
and her critics
thought
her
so.
Sidney's
"Apologie for Poetrie"
is
a school book now,
and
so is Shelley's
"Defense of Poetry".
Yet Sidney
was
defending
all Literature
against the charge
of being
a corrupter of men
on the very eve
of
the Elizabethan
flowering
of the Arts;
of the Arts;
and
a succession
of men and women
went to prison
for selling
Shelley's poems.
The harsh pattern
of Swift's writing
was fixed
because
he scandalized
the religious sensibilities
of Queen Anne.
In our own day,
Thomas Hardy,
James Joyce,
and
D. H. Lawrence
have been
held
to outrage
and
to undermine
Morality.
Yet
it is
overwhelmingly likely
that their books
will survive
when
the thousand
spruce and proper
critics of the day
have been forgotten.
Often
the attack
on
a new outlook
in the Arts
takes
a slightly
different ground.
A book
or
a painting
is held to be
harmful
to
the public mind,
by being
not immoral
but
without morality
at all.
Raphael
was criticized
in this way
for being
amoral,
and so were
Whistler
and
the Pre-Raphaelites.
In Literature,
Tolstoy's
Anna Karenina
was called
amoral,
with
many other works
of
the Russian
novelists and playwrights;
and
the list
of English playwrights
who
have been charged
with
a lack of
any moral sense
goes
all the way
from
the Restoration
to
Oscar Wilde
and
Bernard Shaw.
2
It is
this
last charge
which is
commonly
brought
against
Science.
The claim
is
not that
not that
Science
is actively
anti-moral,
but
that
it is
without morality
of
any kind.
The implication
is
that it
thereby
breeds
in the minds
of
those
who practice it
an indifference
to morality
which
comes
in time
to atrophy
in them
the power
of right judgment
and
the urge
to good conduct.
This charge
seems to me
as false
of
the Sciences
as
of the Arts.
No one
who stops to think
about
Anna Karenina
today
believes
that it
is
without morality,
without morality,
and
that
it makes
no judgment
no judgment
on
the complex actions
of its heroine,
her husband,
and
her lover.
her lover.
On the contrary,
we find it
a deeper
and more moving
book
than
a hundred
conventional novels
about
that triangle,
because
it shows
so much more
patient,
more understanding,
and
more heartbreaking
an insight
into
the forces
which
buffet
its men and women.
It is
not
a conventional book,
it is
a True book.
And
we do not mean
by Truth
some
chance
correspondence
with the Facts
in
a newspaper
about
a despairing woman
who
threw herself
under a train.
We mean
that Tolstoy
understood
people and events,
and
saw within them
the interplay
of
personality,
passion,
convention,
and
the impact on them
of
the to-and-fro
of
outside happenings.
No Ethic
and
no set of Values
has
our respect now
which
does not recognize
the Truth
in this.
There is
indeed
no system
of Morality
which
does not
set
a high value
on Truth
and
on Knowledge,
above all
on
a conscious Knowledge
of oneself.
It is
therefore
at least odd
that Science
should be called
amoral,
and
this
by people
who
in their own lives
set
a high value
on
being Truthful.
For
whatever else
may be
held against Science,
this
cannot be denied,
that
it takes
for
ultimate judgment
one criterion alone,
that
it shall be Truthful.
If there
is
one system
which
can claim
a more
fanatical regard
for Truth
than
Lao-Tze
and
the Pilgrim Fathers,
it is
certainly
Science.
We cannot
of course
put
their Truth
or
any other
Human Values
quite
so simply
as this.
We must
look round
and see
whether,
either
in Ethics
or
in Science,
Truth
does not
extend
beyond
a simple truthfulness
to Fact.
And
we may
take
this
inquiry
into Truth
as
a characteristic test
for Science,
on which
we can
ground
the larger decision,
whether
Science
does indeed
possess
its own Values.
But
do not let us
miss
the simple point.
Whatever else
they have
also meant
by Truth,
men
who take pride
in
their conduct
and
its underlying Values
do set store
by Truthfulness
in
the literal sense.
They
are ashamed
to lie
in fact
and
in intention.
And
this
transcending
respect
for Truthfulness
is
shared
by Science.
T. H. Huxley
was
an Agnostic,
Clifford
was
an Atheist,
and
I know
at least one
great Mathematician
who is
a Scoundrel.
Yet
all of them
rest
their
Scientific Faith
Scientific Faith
on
an uncompromising
adherence
to
the Truth,
and
the irresistible urge
to discover it.
All of them
spurn
that
grey appeal
to expediency
which
is
the withering thumbprint
of
the Administrator
in Committee.
3
In
the last thirty years,
a school of Philosophy
has grown up
which takes
the narrow view,
that
to be True
means
to be
verifiable
in Fact.
It
goes further
and holds
that
no statement
is Meaningful
if
it cannot
be
put to the test
of Factual Truth,
at least
in theory.
This test
would limit
our
serious conversation
to
what
the man in the street
calls
Scientific matters,
which
can be
defined
and
verified exactly.
It rejects altogether
such topics
as
Value,
Ethics,
and
Sentiments,
Sentiments,
claiming that
discussion of them
may be comforting
and
even entertaining,
but
is strictly
without Meaning.
'Virtue
is
its own reward'
is
in this Philosophy
a piece
of Meaningless
good cheer;
sensible Philosophers
only
discuss
such statements
as
'Water
is
made up
of
Hydrogen
and
Oxygen'.
Here we have
a Philosophy
in which
Science
seems to have
gone over
to
the counter attack,
by
replying
to
the charge
that
it contains
no Values
with
the curt remark
that Values
are
a lot of nonsense
anyway.
But
as
so often happens
when
Philosophers
take up arms
for Science,
the Science
that
is being defended
is
long out of date.
The ideal
of
the Meaningful
and
the True
which
this Positivist Philosophy
sets up
is indeed
the nineteenth-century
conception
of Science.
These are
the notions
of Meaning
and
of Truth
which
Joule
had in mind
a hundred years ago
when
he showed
that
Heat
is precisely
a form
of Mechanical Energy,
or later
Hertz
when
he found
the Radio Waves
whose existence
had
been implied
by
Clerk Maxwell's
equations
of
the Electromagnetic Field.
But
such notions
of Truth
have already
turned out
to be
insufficient
for
Science itself,
in
the modern sense.
So that
it is certainly
an odd service
to sweep
Value and Ethics
out
of the door
with
this broom,
which
at once
also
gets rid
of Science
and
of
Human Knowledge.
There are
a number of grounds
why
Logical Positivism
will
not do;
and they have
this
in common,
that
it is
a piecemeal Philosophy.
It models itself
on
the heroic attempt
by
Russell
and
Whitehead
to derive
all Mathematics,
including
such
difficult ideas
as
the Continuous
and
the Infinite,
from
a finite number
of axioms.
Mathematics
was
to be built up
step by step
from
a set
of particulate
or atomic
propositions.
This was
a great
and
an important work
in Logic.
It did not
wholly succeed,
even
in its own field.
But it remains
a monument
there
to
the two masters
who created it.
The
Positivist Philosophers
have taken
this attempt
for their model,
in picturing
Knowledge
in
the same way
as
built up
from pieces
of particulate Fact.
But if
Mathematics
has difficulty
in fitting
this structure,
it is plain
that
Empirical Knowledge
does
not
begin
to fit it.
Obviously
we do not get
our Knowledge
in this way,
from
particulate pieces
of Information
like
'this is Red'.
The Mind
does not begin
from such
Sense Experiences,
but always
from
integrated bundles
of them,
that is,
from
Things.
How else
do I recognize
what I am
now looking at
as
a Book,
and
identify it
as
the same book
I was looking at
before
I turned
the page?
We do not
make up
our Knowledge
like
a Meccano Set
piecemeal
from
minute
nuts and bolts
of Experience.
This
in itself
so far
is only
an issue
of Psychology.
But
there is
a deeper issue,
which
is this,
that
neither
can we
break
our experience
down
into these
nuts and bolts.
Not even
as
a hypothesis
will it do
to think
of Knowledge
as
reducible
to
atomic propositions.
I have
already spoken
of
the logical reasons
why
this
cannot be so.
If it were,
there would
remain,
in
this atomic world
of Knowledge,
statements
which
could be
neither
True nor False.
So
the Logical Positivist,
having been
at pains
to call everything
not in
his Meccano world
nonsense,
would discover
that
even this world
is still
chock-full
of nonsense.
But
I do not want
to stop
at this
logical failing,
as if
we were
scoring
debating points.
What is
the deeper reason
why
the atomic construction
of Knowledge
fails?
Why ought we
to have
foreseen
that
it must break down
in contradiction?
The answer is
that this
atomic construction
supposes,
like
the Atomic Science
of
the last century,
that
there lies
below our experience
a set of Facts
which are
more exact
than experience;
which are
indeed Exact.
'This is Red,'
we are told,
and
it is assumed
that
we have now
dug down
to
a base of Knowledge
where
there is
no more room
for disagreement:
either
This is Red,
or
it is not Red.
But what
is 'This'
that
we are both
supposed,
the speaker
and I,
to see
as
the same spot?
And what is
the Red
about which
as
sensible beings
we cannot differ?
Red light
has a wavelength
of about
one
three-hundred-thousandth
of an inch:
to what
order
of accuracy
are we
to read it
in order
to agree
on
our atomic proposition?
In the world
of Science,
neither
'This'
nor
'Red'
are entities
which
can be defined
with
complete precision.
'This'
will always
escape
in
the Brownian
to-and-fro
of atoms,
and
'Red'
must be
embedded
in
a range
of uncertainty
of
a few wavelengths.
The world
cannot
be described,
as Positivists
have
explicitly supposed,
by giving
exact
physical co-ordinates
to
every point
in a statement,
and
then
verifying
whether or not
the statement
is True.
Every co-ordinate
reference
must
carry with it
an
area of Uncertainty.
And this
implies
that
the verification
is itself
Uncertain,
and
must be
allowed
a margin of error.
To think otherwise
is
to wish oneself back
to
the atomic paradise
of
a hundred and fifty years ago,
and
to
the blissful simplicity
of which
Blake said
with
imaginative contempt
that
it hoped
'to build
a Universe
with
Farthing Balls'.
It is
indeed clear
that
there is
an essential fault
within
the basic conception
of the Positivist,
that
we can
judge Truth
by
a simple act
of verification.
What
are we
to verify?
An
atomic proposition,
that is
a statement
in the simplest form
about
the simplest
kind of Fact.
But
the Facts
do not keep still
for us,
either
in
Space
or
in Time.
I cannot
verify now
a statement
about
a Fact
which
has
already passed.
I must
make
my statement
about
a future Fact,
and
this means
that
I must
turn it
into
a prediction.
Indeed,
the idea
of verification
must imply
prediction,
and
prediction
as we have seen
cannot
be separated
from
its own area
of Uncertainty.
4
What
I have written
is not meant
to belittle
nineteenth-century
Science.
By no means;
it was
a wonderful achievement,
and
the bulk of it remains so
to this day.
But
there runs under it
a conception of the world
which
has turned out to be
too simple.
The conception
was of a world
which could be described
exactly,
if not by today's scientists
then by tomorrow's.
I learned to think
about that world
from the lively account
of
a master
of simple exposition,
the Geometer
and
Philosopher
William Clifford.
His account
was called
characteristically
"The Common Sense
of the Exact Sciences".
The difference
between
his title and mine
is not accidental.
I have deliberately
chosen the title
"The Common Sense
of Science"
because
it underlines
the difference
between
our two centuries.
We see today
that
in the strict sense
there are
no exact Sciences.
There is Science,
and there is
Common Sense;
and
both must learn
to assimilate
into their
methods and basic ideas
the
underlying
Uncertainties
of
all Knowledge.
The best Scientists
of the last century
did foresee this.
I have spoken
of Clifford,
and
it is fair
to the memory
of that great man
to recall
that
he had
some
of this foresight.
Indeed,
Clifford
has
a genius
for
such
Prophetic insight.
"The Common Sense
of
he Exact Sciences"
contains
the first hint
of the idea
that
massive bodies
give
a local curvature
to space,
which
Einstein
has since
worked out fully.
Clifford
was
after all
a contemporary
of Galton,
and
when he died
at thirty-five
his book
was edited by
the founder
of
modern Statistics,
Karl Pearson.
And here
is what Clifford said
about
Scientific Truth,
looking out
of
the nineteenth century
forward
into ours.
Remember, then,
that Scientific thought
is the guide of action;
that the Truth at which it arrives
is not that
which we can ideally contemplate
without error,
but that which
we may act upon without fear;
and you cannot fail to see
that Scientific thought
is not
an accomplishment
or condition
of Human Progress,
but
Human Progress itself.
This is
an arresting thought
on
a number of counts.
It puts pithily
the view
of
Science as action
which
I have underlined.
And the action
looks forward;
it is distinguished
from Contemplation
by
looking
towards the Future.
And
arresting too
here
is
the criterion
of
what is True.
The realistic basis
of Science
as
I have stressed it
cannot be put better
than in
Clifford's definition,
that
its Truth
'is not that
which we can
ideally contemplate
without error,
but
that which
we may
act upon
without fear.'
What Science
observes,
what Science
predicts
has
all the shortcomings
of Fact.
The Facts
supply
the signal
for
the Future,
but
the signal
is
necessarily Uncertain
and
its interpretation
against
the background
of
the irrelevant
will be
inaccurate.
The prediction
which
we base
on
the signal
must be
a Statistical one.
It
does not
read
the Future,
it
forecasts it;
and
the forecast
has
Meaning
only
because
we couple it
with
its own estimate
of
Uncertainty.
The Future
is
as it were
always
a little
out of focus,
and
everything
that
we foresee
in it
is seen
embedded
in
a small area
of Uncertainty.
It is
the
Human Situation
and
the situation
of Science.
We do not
Contemplate
the Facts
without error,
but
because
we know
what we are doing,
we
may
act
upon them
without fear.
'Because
we know
what
we are doing':
this
is
the crux
of Science.
We
are not
merely
observing
and
predicting
Facts;
and
that is why
any
Philosophy
which builds up
Science
only
from Facts
is mistaken.
We know,
that is
we find
Laws;
and
every
Human Action
uses
these Laws,
and
at the same time
tests them
and
feels towards
new Laws.
It is not
the Form
of
these Laws
which matters.
The Laws
of Science,
like those
which we use
in
our private behavior,
remain
helpful and Truthful
whether
they contain
words like
'always',
or
only
'more often than not'.
What matters
is
the recognition
of the Law
in
the Facts.
It is
the Law
which
we verify:
the Pattern,
the Order,
the Structure
of events.
This is why
Science
is so full
of
the symbolism
of
Numbers and Geometry,
which are
the most
familiar expressions
of
Structural relations.
5
There is
no sense
at all
in which
Science
can
be called
a mere
description
of Facts.
no sense
at all
in which
Science
can
be called
a mere
description
of Facts.
It is
in no sense,
as
Humanists
sometimes pretend,
a neutral record
of
what happens
in
an endless
Mechanical Encyclopedia.
This
mistaken view
goes back
to
the eighteenth century.
It pictures Scientists
as
Utilitarians
still crying
Let be!
and
still believing
that
the world runs best
with
no other
regulating principles
than
Natural Gravitation
and
Human self-interest.
But
this
picture
of the world
of
Mandeville
and
Bentham
and
Dickens's "Hard Times"
was
never Science.
For Science
is not
the blank
record
of Facts,
but
the
search
for Order
within Facts.
the blank
record
of Facts,
but
the
search
for Order
within Facts.
And
the
Truth of Science
is not
Truth to Fact,
which
can never be
more
than approximate,
but
the Truth
of
the Laws
which
we see
within
the Facts.
And
this kind
of
Truth
is
as difficult
and
as Human
as
the sense
of Truth
in a painting
which is
not
a photograph,
or
the feeling
of Emotional Truth
in
a movement
in Music.
When we
speak
of Truth,
we make
a Judgment
between
What Matters
and
What Does Not,
and
we feel
the unity
of
its different parts.
We do this
as much
in
Science
as in
the Arts
or
in Daily Life.
We make
a Judgment
when
we prefer
one Theory
to another
even
in Science,
since
there is
always
an endless number
of theories
which
can account for
all
the known Facts.
And
the principles
of
this Judgment
have
some
deep appeal
which
is more
than
merely Factual.
William of Ockham
first suggested
to Scientists
that
they should
prefer
that Theory
which uses
in its explanation
the smallest number
of
Unknown Agents.
Science
has
held
to this principle
now
for
six hundred years.
But
is there
indeed
any ground
for it
other than
a kind of
Aesthetic Satisfaction,
much
like that
of
sacrificing
your Queen
at Chess
in order
to mate
with
a Knight?
We cannot
define
Truth in Science
until
we move
from
Fact
to
Law.
And
within
the body of Laws
in turn,
what
impresses us
as Truth
is
the
Orderly Coherence
of
the pieces.
They
fit together
like
the Characters
in
a great Novel,
or like
the words
in
a Poem.
Indeed,
we
should keep
that
last analogy
by us
always.
For Science
is
a Language,
and
like a Language,
it defines
its parts
by
the way
they make up
a Meaning.
Every Word
in the Sentence
has
some
Uncertainty of Definition,
and yet
the Sentence
defines its own
Meaning
and
that
of its Words
conclusively.
It is
the internal
Unity
and
Coherence
of Science
which
give it Truth,
and
which make it
a better
System
of Prediction
than
any
less Orderly Language.
6
I have
singled out
Truth
among
the Human Values
for
this reason.
singled out
Truth
among
the Human Values
for
this reason.
It is common
to all
Systems of Value,
and
is fundamental
to
most of them.
And
it is
a Value.
We cannot
take it for granted
as
something
self-evident
in Science
any more than
in Art
or Morals
or Religion.
In all of them
Truth
rests on
an act
of
Free Human Judgment.
In
none of them
of course
can
this Judgment
be exercised
without
experience:
there is
no Truth,
not even
Religious Truth,
which
calls for
no Sanction
from Fact.
There are
other
Values:
Goodness,
Beauty,
Right Conduct.
They have
their echoes
even
in Science;
and
there is
one Value,
Freedom of Human Ideas,
which is
the Essential Condition
for
the health
of Science.
But
it is
not my point
to show
laboriously
that
Science
as much as
the Arts
creates and implies
all
the Human Values.
I have wanted
to show
only
in one example
that
Science
cannot exist
without
Judgments of Value.
only
in one example
that
Science
cannot exist
without
Judgments of Value.
This example,
the Truth,
is
a critical one;
and
it will serve to show
that
Science
cannot exist
as
a blank
and
Mechanical Activity.
There is
still more
in Science
than this.
It shares
the Values
of
all Human Action,
and
it also
adds
to these Values.
The Human Values
penetrate through
all
our Actions,
and
they are
strikingly alike
in Civilizations
which
are
thousands of years
apart.
The Aztecs
and
the Minoans,
the Chaldees,
the Cherokees,
and
the Shakers
held in common
ideas
about
Human
Dignity and Value
which go
far deeper
than
the surface differences
of
time and place.
The likenesses
are
as heartening
in
their Arts
and
their speculations.
Yet,
though
the Values
are alike,
they
are
not identical.
The
Human Values
change,
slowly
but
not negligibly.
And
in
this change,
Science
plays
a creative part.
For
the Values
rest
at bottom
on
Acts of Judgment.
And every
Act of Judgment
is
a division
of the field
of our experience
into
What Matters
and
What Does Not.
I spoke of this
at
the beginning
of this book:
that
at
the basis
of
Human Thought
lies
the Judgment
of
what is like
and
what is unlike.
In picking out
what
we shall call
alike,
we make
the basic Judgment,
that
here is something
which is
Important to us.
We do this
when
we say
that
men
are
like women,
or
that
the earth
is like
the planets,
or
that
the air
is
like wine.
Aldous Huxley
in
his novel
"Barren Leaves"
speculates
at length
about
the word 'love'
in different
European languages;
but I,
coming
to England
as a boy,
was
struck more
by
the existence
in English alone
of
the verb
'to like'.
The Human Values
are bound up
with
what
we Judge
to be
like and unlike;
and
when Science
shifts
that Judgment,
it makes
as
profound
a shift
in
these Values.
The Greeks
built
a wonderful
Civilization,
yet
it did not
outrage
their
sense of values
to
hold men
in Slavery.
They
did not feel
the Slave
and
Citizen
to be alike
Men.
By
the end
of
the eighteenth century,
it was felt
in
the Western world
that
all white men
are alike;
but
William Wilberforce
spent
a lifetime
in persuading
his generation
that
black slaves
and white
are alike
in Human Dignity.
Science
helped
to create
that sensibility,
by
widening the view
of
what is like
and
what unlike.
It helped
to widen it enough
to make
cruelty to animals
a
particularly
detested offense
in England.
In
our own generation,
we
have seen
the Human Values
perverted
in Nazi Germany
into
a monstrous scale
of self-approval.
And
the perversion
was bolstered
by
a deliberate attempt
to go back on
what
Science
and
Humanity
has struggled
slowly
to grasp,
the likeness
of Man.
The hateful Values
of
the Nazi
rest at bottom
on
this
False Judgment,
which
Science
for
three hundred years
has tried
to root out:
that
what I do
is
not like
what
others do.
7
is
the constant urge
of Science
as well as
of the Arts,
to broaden
the
likeness
for which
we grope
under
the Facts.
When
we discoverthe
wider likeness,
whether
between
Space and Time,
or
between
the Bacillus,
the Virus,
and the Crystal,
we
enlarge
the Order
in the Universe;
but
more than this,
we enlarge
its Unity.
And it is
the
Unity of Nature,
Living and Dead,
for which
our thought
reaches.
This is
a far deeper
conception
than
any assumption
that
Nature
must
be uniform.
We seek
to
find Nature
one,
a
coherent Unity.
This gives
to Scientists
their
sense of mission
and,
let us
acknowledge it,
of
Aesthetic fulfillment:
that
every research
carries
the sense
of
drawing together
the threads
of
the World
into
a
patterned web.
Each
Law of Science
so
holds together
a scattered array
of Facts.
But
the Laws
themselves
are not
the final
Unifying agents.
Each Law
is still
only a Rule
for
making Predictions,
as
Aristotle predicted
that
apples
will
go on
falling
to the ground.
The great
Unifying thoughts
are
knots
where the Laws
cross one another
and
are
held together:
the thought
that
all Matter is alike,
or
that earthly Space
runs beyond
the stars,
or
that
there is
a physical continuity
from
one generation
to the next.
We come
to take
these
crossing places
for granted,
and
forget
how long it took
to
make
these concepts.
Yet
it is they
that give
the Unity:
the concept
of Matter,
of Space,
of Evolution
and
Inheritance.
They are
the links
and
the critical
joints
in the whole
Structure
of
our Understanding.
And
they are
not
self-evident:
Mass,
Energy,
Mind,
the nervous system,
the ecology
of
host and enzyme:
these
were
not obvious
to Aquinas
and
ready
to
be shuffled
into Laws
by
the first
gifted Mathematician.
On the contrary,
just as
the Laws
unite
the Facts,
so
the concepts
of Science
unite
its Laws
into
an
Orderly world
which
hangs on
those
bold knots
in the network.
When
we follow
the growth
of
a Science,
we come
to understand
how
that movement
has been
probing for
these
Unifying concepts.
Look at
the movement
of Biology
since
the day
of
Ray and Linnaeus:
the listing
of
like Species,
the
discovery of cells,
of
their division
and of
their sexual fusion;
the elaboration
of
the mechanisms
of Inheritance
and
of Natural Selection;
and
from all these,
the
long distillation
of
the rich
and
many-sided concept
of Evolution.
Look
at Chemistry,
from
Dalton's Law
of
the combination
of
Constant Weights
through
the
Periodic Table
of the Elements
and
the work
of
Davy and Faraday
on
their
Electric behavior,
to
the complex Concepts
of
Molecular Structure
today
and of
the more
and
the less
saturated
shells
of Electrons
in
the Chemical atom.
Or look at
the march
of
Physics to Unity:
the slow
crystallization
in the
Scientific Revolution
of the
Universal Concepts
of
Matter,
Mass,
and Weight;
the concept
of
the Conservation
of Mass,
the Concept of
Energy
in
its many forms,
in
Rumford
and
Joule
and
Clerk Maxwell,
and
of its
Conservation;
the
leap
by Planck
in 1900
to
the particulate
Nature
of Energy;
and
then
the most brilliant piece
of
Unifying insight,
Einstein's identification
of
Mass and Energy
in
a single Concept.
We have
seen this
lead to
the creation
of
Energy from Matter;
to
a picture
of
Space
as closed
but
possibly expanding;
and now,
in the last years,
to
the speculation
that
in the process
of expansion,
gravitational Energy
is
indirectly lost,
and
may
reappear
as
new-born Matter.
Science
is
a process
of
creating
new Concepts
which
Unify
our understanding
of the world,
and
the process
is today
bolder
and
more
far-reaching,
more
triumphant even
than
at
the great threshold
of
the Scientific Revolution.
8
The Concepts
of
Value
are
not different
in kind
from these.
It is
not easy
to
formulate
Laws
of Art;
at least,
as
the Augustans
showed
so woefully,
the Laws
which
are
easy to formulate
are
bad Laws.
Yet
there is
a likeness
which
runs under
all
works of Art,
and
the single works
are
held together
by
common standards.
And
the standards
in turn
are
Unified
in
such
larger Concepts,
such knots
which
hold
the different
Historical tastes
together,
as
the Concepts
of Beauty
and Truth
and Coherence.
So
the Rules of conduct
run together
at last
in
the Concepts
of Truth
and Goodness
and Justice
and Right
and Duty.
These
Concepts of Value
are
not the same
as
the
Concepts of Science.
But
like them
they express
the
deep relation
between
the Human Mind
and
the world
which
it matches.
If this
were
a book
about
Aesthetics,
I should have
studied
the way in which
Concepts
like Taste
and Fitness
and Beauty
have grown
and
how they
cohere together.
And
if this
were
a book
about Ethics,
I should have
studied
another range
of
Concepts of Value.
In a book
about Science,
I have looked at
the growth
of
its Concepts:
the Machine
and
the Model,
Order,
Cause
and
Chance,
Prediction
and
the Future,
the fundamental
Concept of Law
and
the particular Concepts
which range
from
Waves
to
Matter
and
the Cell.
All these
are expressions
of
the relation of Man
and
his societies
to
the Universal Nature.
None
is achieved
without
Man's Judgment
of
that Order,
what is
like
and
what is
unlike,
what in it
Matters
and
What Does Not.
Let us
not forget
this
Judgment
even
in
the humblest Law
about
Ohms
and
Volts
and
Amperes,
for it rests
at bottom
on
a choice
of something
that
Man
feels
to bind him
to
his Environment.
The Judgment
is already
in
the work.
The
work of Art
contains
the
Artist's Judgment;
so that
it has been
wisely said
of it,
that
it is not we
by our standards
who Judge
the
work of Art,
but
the work
which
Judges us.
And
in the
same sense,
it is not we
who stand
perplexed
round
the discoveries
of Science
who
Judge it,
but
Science
which
Judges us.
Einstein
rounded out
three centuries
of
questioning
of Nature
when
he
equated
Energy and Mass
in
a single line,
E = MC2.
This is
not the same
Unification
of Concepts
as
that
for which
Keats
was searching
when
he closed
the
"Ode on a Grecian Urn"
with
the lines,
Beauty is truth, truth beauty, -- that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.
But
the likenessis
more important
than
the difference.
The
likenessis
more helpful
in
making us
understand
that the
Concepts of Science
are
like the
Concepts of Value,
monuments
to
our sense
of
Unity in Nature.
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